The California Court of Appeal took the rare step of overturning Benjamin Puentes’ statutory rape conviction and ordering that the charges be dismissed against him because he was subjected to “vindictive prosecution” by the Santa Clara County District Attorney.
Puentes was a juvenile hall counselor. He was charged with statutory rape of someone more than three years younger (a felony) and contributing to the delinquency of a minor (a misdemeanor) for allegedly drinking beer and then having sex at his home with a 16-year-old girl who had at one time had stayed at the juvenile hall.
Puentes first trial ended in a mistrial because the jury couldn’t reach a verdict on either charge. Puentes was retried.
After Puentes second trial a mistrial was declared on the rape charge after the jury couldn’t reach a verdict, but the jury convicted him of the misdemeanor charge of contributing to the delinquency of a minor.
The Santa Clara County District Attorney’s Office made a motion to dismiss the rape charge “in furtherance of justice.” The judge granted the motion.
The California Court of Appeal then overturned Puentes’ misdemeanor conviction because of the judge’s error instructing the jury. During a subsequent hearing the trial judge ruled the prosecution had failed to prove all the elements required to establish Puentes had contributed to the delinquency of a minor and ordered his acquittal.
Puentes thought he was a free man.
He was until the DA refiled the rape charge. Puentes filed a pretrial motion to dismiss it on the ground that since it had been dismissed at the request of the DA “in furtherance of justice,” it was vindictive prosecution for the DA to refile it in retaliation for Puentes’ successful appeal of his misdemeanor conviction. The judge denied Puentes’ motion and after his third trial he was convicted by a jury of statutory rape. He was sentenced to three years of felony probation.
Puentes appealed on his conviction.
The U.S. Supreme Court ruled in 1974 that “it was not constitutionally permissible for the State to respond to [the defendant’s] invocation of his statutory right to appeal by bringing a more serious charge against him prior to the trial de novo.” (Blackledge v. Perry (1974) 417 U.S. 21, 28-29.) The Court also ruled in 1982 that an individual “certainly may not be punished for exercising a protected statutory or constitutional right.” (U.S. v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 372 (1982).
Puentes’ primary argument was that “he was subjected to vindictive prosecution” because there was no new evidence to justify refiling the rape charge after it had already been dismissed at the request of the DA. Puentes also argued the DA’s refiling of the rape charge was an unconstitutional punishment of him for exercising his right to appeal that resulted in the overturning of his misdemeanor conviction.
After analyzing the course of events in Puentes’ case, the Court of Appeal determined that the prosecution had not dispelled its burden to overcome the “presumption of vindictiveness” created by the refiling of the rape charge, because “the prosecutor believed that justice had been served by the misdemeanor conviction only until defendant prevailed on appeal. … the only inference from this fact is that the prosecutor changed her mind because defendant prevailed on appeal.” Consequently, the trial judge had erred in determining that the facts and the law did not support a finding of “prosecutor vindictiveness” and dismissal of the rape charge. (People v. Benjamin Puentes, No H034546 (6th Appellate Dist Ct, 12-20-2010))
The Court ordered the reversal of Puentes’ conviction and that the trial court dismiss the rape charge.
By Hans Sherrer
Justice Denied
